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The Problem of Obviousness 
 
Benjamin Goldberg 
 
 
1. The Problem of Obviousness 
There’s no such thing as obviousness. 
 This isn’t, of course, itself obvious; nor is it clear why it should be a problem. So let 
me start elsewhere, with the anti-vaccine movement. A friend of mine laid out the 
‘obvious’ position: there are facts and rationality on one side, unenlightened ignorance 
and bigotry on the other. Scientists versus fools, and the fools don’t even know what 
game is being played.  
 I get it. Vaccination is important, and the anti-vax crowd has had real and 
devastating effects. It’s certainly easy to accuse them of being fools, fools who deny 
things that are plainly true in favor of the obviously false. Rhetorically, this is powerful: 
it’s an accusation that our opponents here—the fools—suffer from some sort of 
epistemic impairment, an accusation that they cannot recognize truths that should be 
obvious. If our opponents are so afflicted, we can dismiss them from our conversations, 
can exile them from our communities. They are beyond the space of reasons, immune 
to facts. We can ignore them because, as my father used to say, you just can’t argue 
with a sick mind. They are fools, and they are doomed (perhaps us with them). 
 But I think this is a mistaken attitude, not because the anti-vaccine folks are 
reasonable or correct or even honest—but rather because of the perspective gained 
through the study of the history and philosophy of science. The problem of obviousness 
presents a number of subtle issues of epistemology that have not yet been absorbed by 
philosophers more generally, let alone by the public at large. Here I hope to show how 
the rhetoric in these sorts of debates about science and culture is based upon a faulty 
premise: that of obviousness. When we assume that something is obvious, or should be 
obvious once we’ve explained it, we make this error, an error of assuming that we share 
a set of background beliefs that could make some fact or theory reasonable or obvious. 
Obviousness is never obviousness tout court; there is only ever obviousness in context. 
Making a claim about how something is obvious is (often if not always) a way of 
rhetorically bullying your opponent.  
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 The problem of obviousness, indeed the concept of the obvious itself, is not one 
often directly addressed in academic philosophy, nor have I seen it discussed in any 
real detail or breadth outside of academia.i However, while obviousness has not been 
directly addressed, philosophers of science have, I believe, provided the intellectual 
resources needed to understand this phenomenon, and in what follows I shall make use 
of some of the resources of philosophy of science, in particular interpretations of the 
problem of underdetermination.  
 Though the problem of obviousness is not well acknowledged, it plagues many 
deeply important discussions about science (among other things): not just vaccines, but 
evolution and creationism, global warming, genetically modified foods, and so forth. 
What I hope to do in this essay is to describe and diagnose this problem, to argue that it 
is a real and important phenomenon. I do so in an abstract way, as I’m not interested in 
the specifics of any of these particular debates, but rather in how obviousness, as a 
general historical and epistemological issue, can be seen as contributing to the 
intractability of these debates. The goal of this essay, then, is to expand upon this 
rather subtle point of history and epistemology in order to make a clear case against 
obviousness, to explain how I think it works, and to make room for the idea of 
epistemic history in accounting for how different groups might understand and 
evaluate claims in light of those histories. Using a wide variety of novel examples not 
often noted in these discussions, I hope to demonstrate that the problem of 
obviousness exists and that it could potentially affect any and every domain of human 
knowledge, from animal ethnology to writing systems. In other words, I hope to 
challenge the rhetoric of obviousness.  
  
2. Undermining Obviousness  
So let us come to the main concern of obviousness: it’s obvious that vaccines work; that 
they don’t cause autism; it’s obvious that creationism is false; it’s obvious that the world 
is undergoing climate change. Obviousness seems…well, obvious. Some things are just 
simply and immediately available to us, present and apparent. If you don’t see or 
understand something, the problem must be with you, your education, and, probably, 
your terrible upbringing—a definite case, we surmise, of epistemic abuse.  
 In my own, recondite, corner of academia, I have often witnessed a claim of 
obviousness wielded, rapier-like, to skewer argumentative opponents. This version of 
the mistake of obviousness is slightly different than my main concern, and is expressed 
in terms of the intuitiveness of certain propositions, claims that the burgeoning 
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empirical field of experimental philosophy has, to my mind, convincingly demonstrated 
to be largely what the Irish call blarney.ii For instance, research by Edouard Machery 
and others has indicated that intuitions about reference vary cross-culturally, and that 
what (say) North American philosophers find obvious about certain semantic situations 
depends on enculturation and language.iii Other research, initiated by Joshua Knobe, 
has shown that there are asymmetries in our attributions of intentionality, and that in 
these situations non-moral evaluation seems to depend upon moral evaluation, known 
now as the Knobe effect.iv So, it seems, what smart folks think is obvious or intuitive is 
a terrible guide to the truth, and that, despite what many academics seem to think, 
cleverness is not at all an epistemological oracle. We’ve all been led desperately astray 
by the myth of Newton’s apple: intuition and insight are important, but true knowledge 
never springs into the world fully formed, as Athena did from Zeus’ head. No: knowing 
requires doing, it requires hard work, empirical and experimental research.  
 If the experimental philosophers are right, then intuitions, and with them claims to 
obviousness, are to be viewed with suspicion. That is, a claim that X is intuitive 
provides no evidence that X is true! And while the experimental philosophers have 
gotten there through the methods of experimental psychology, there is another, also 
empirical mode by which we can make our claims against obviousness: history. And 
thus we come to a most interesting set of examples and observations on just this 
subject in a delightful blog about the history of scientific books and papers (and other 
sundry items), J.F. Ptak Science Books. John Ptak notes that,  
 
… ‘the obvious’ isn’t until it is. For example, Etienne Durand was the first 
architect to include examples of plans of different buildings on the same 
scale side-by-side, and that wasn't until the mid-19th century—clearly 
this would be pro forma for just about describing two elements of 
anything, but it just simply wasn't done until 160 years ago or so. This 
also applies in a way (though there are more complexities involved as to 
why this is different) to the antisepsis practices of Joseph Lister who in 
simply washing surgical tools between use on different patients (and 
hand-washing and the use of surgical masks and so on) increased the 
chances of surviving surgery by at least 50%...and these practices weren't 
begun until the mid-19th century.v 
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Ptak’s examples are revealing and important, for they show how making progress—be it 
in architecture or surgery—has little place for obviousness; an important lesson for our 
debates. Something we take for granted, something we see as basic common sense is 
revealed to be not at all obvious but in fact a deeply novel and world changing 
discovery. The results of science are not the result of genius (at least alone), they are the 
result of hard work, a multitude of observations, failures, and a good bit of luck. The 
‘obvious’ is a result of progress, and it is often the result of technological change. 
 The example of Lister is particularly instructive, for American children are brought 
up with the gospel of hygiene, and washing one’s hands seems as obvious as the heat of 
the sun. But, even today, the importance of such hygienic habits is not obvious 
everywhere and to everyone—in populations suffering in extreme poverty, the 
education that becomes every American child’s ‘common sense’ is simply not available, 
nor is access to clean water. People don’t wash in filthy water because they are stupid, 
or because they cannot see an obvious harm; rather, they do so because they have no 
option, and are often ignorant of the true harm. The choices we make, the beliefs we 
hold are a matter of opportunity: you cannot know something if you’ve never been 
presented with an occasion to learn about it before. 
 So how does something become obvious? I think the basic story is a simple one: we 
are told or we learn in some way some fact, or strategy, or procedure. Once so exposed 
and indoctrinated, this knowledge becomes, as it were, natural, and the fact that it was 
learned, that we had to be led into it, fades into the background. We’re probably all 
familiar with a kind of basic version of this idea from the realm of optical illusions, 
most famously perhaps the following picture: 
 
 
Figure 1: Just some dots? (The first example I have found is from Life Magazine 58:7, February 19 1965, 120) 
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At first the image seems a series of random, meaningless dots. But, eventually, or if 
someone points it out, one realizes that it is the picture of a Dalmatian, and the image 
snaps into focus: you cannot unsee it once seen you have seen it, in the same way that 
an obvious idea is hard to image as anything but obvious, as anything but an edict 
direct from Nature or Reason. So what we see is partially a function of our expectations, 
of our knowledge, of our observations and, importantly, our epistemic history, our 
experiences and memories. The path we take through the world affects us and deeply 
shapes the beliefs we hold true and those we think false. 
 It is, perhaps, the sign of a truly brilliant idea that, once it is revealed to the world, it 
strikes us as so astoundingly obvious and apparent that we can hardly wrap our minds 
around any other way of doing or seeing things. That is, some things become obvious 
more quickly than others. Examples abound in the realm of technology, where 
innovation has become a meaningless buzzword, examples that have led to the 
enrichment of many a patent lawyer. The best example is perhaps the invention of the 
modern touchscreen smartphone by Apple—an idea that, in retrospect, seems 
blindingly obvious, whose component parts were all available, but whose form and 
integration was not apparent, and, indeed, was greeted with suspicion, derision, and 
scorn.  
 Indeed, obviousness is a part and parcel of patent law—there are a host of legal 
scholars and lawyers who have written hundreds of thousands of words on it, deciding 
nothing, perhaps, but struggling to come up with something that even an American 
jury might be able to use in trials. A vain hope. 
 But, perhaps, as I’ve been urging, obviousness is a myth, a fact about the psychology 
of learning and knowledge, not a fact about epistemic intuitiveness and transparency. 
Obviousness is something that, when we accuse our opponents of mistaking it, is not 
just uncharitable, but epistemically unjust, a fact more often about our lack of empathy 
for people who think differently than about epistemic saintliness.  
 I now want to discuss a number of interesting and novel examples of how 
obviousness isn’t. I start with two from the history of writing systems. These are, to my 
mind, particularly striking. 
 Writing systems did not develop until relatively recently in the history of homo 
sapiens (who appeared roughly 200,000 years ago, on a Thursday), in a case of 
independent co-creation that occurred around 3500 B.C.E. in Egypt and Mesopotamia. 
Given this late arrival, writing is not an obvious invention, nor perhaps a necessary one, 
and seems deeply related to the introduction of other technologies like agriculture and 
Obviousness 
39 
 
bureaucracy. But, further, the development of writing systems demonstrates that many 
seemingly obvious aspects of our modern systems are not in fact so obvious. Ancient 
Greek provides a truly wonderful (and wonderfully named) example in boustrophedon, 
which literally means ‘ox-turning,’ and which also describes the phenomenon in 
question.   
 Ancient scripts, including Safaitic and Sabaean, but most commonly Greek, did not 
have preferred orientations: they were often written left to right or right to left. But, 
most shocking to the modern mind, such scripts were also often written in a 
meandering, alternating method we call boustrophedon, going from left to right, to 
right to left, and back to left to right. My first encounter with this idea was true and 
deep befuddlement: surely, I thought, writers must have picked a direction and stuck 
with it, surely such examples as might exist are the work of a few, mad writers? But, 
upon reflection, as is often the case when we begin to take seriously other ways of 
doing and seeing things, there is a logic here: if one is writing, say left to right, there is 
a kind of convenience to just starting on the side you end up on, and then going the 
other way. Indeed, there is an efficiency of motion, a conservation of energy, found in 
boustrophedon that is lost when we choose a single direction from which to write. 
 Another example, equally puzzling, at least at first, concerns the invention of 
another writing technology, something we don’t even really see anymore: the spaces 
between words. Paul Saenger has beautifully and exhaustingly discussed this idea in his 
1997 Space Between Words.vi Saenger describes how, after the fall of Rome, we see the 
gradual development and invention of the separation of words, 
somethingsoobviousthatifIdidnotdoityoumightthinkIwasmad! Up until this point, 
Saenger notes that the separation of words was a task for a particular reader’s mind and 
voice, in part because of the very different cultural context in which writing was used 
and understood. Reading took place out loud, in an oral context—silent reading, too, is 
a non-obvious invention, and is central to Saenger’s account. This particular social 
context is fundamental for understanding not just reading, but writing systems and 
readers’ relationships to them. In the context of the ancient world, some of the very 
attributes we see as fundamental to reading, such as easy access and retrieval of 
information, or the diffusion of literacy across the population by making it easier to 
understand difficult texts, were simply not seen as advantageous. The ancient literary 
world was elitist, and this mentality figures significantly in the history of writing and 
the development of silent reading.  
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 Thus we see that facts about the organization of society—here in particular 
convenience and elitism—affected the development of writing, and deeply so. Such 
themes are omnipresent in the histories of technology and science. Indeed, the very 
methods and definition of science, of inquiry into nature, are the result of historical 
processes, and take on particular meanings and have different consequences in 
different places and times.  
 My next example concerns something about science and its methodology that seems 
obvious from a modern point of view: the need to inquire into the material constituents 
and causes of natural things. Indeed, many might (and, indeed, have) taken these to be 
definitions of what natural inquiry means. But, as Nathan Sivin and Geoffrey Lloyd point 
out in their wonderful effort in cross-cultural history of philosophy and science, these 
questions are not obvious at all, at least once we begin to ask the right sorts of 
questions: 
 
Why did Greek philosophers and scientists focus so often on the 
constituent elements of material objects, on their natures, on the 
imperceptible reality that underlies the appearances? Why was there so 
much concern for the causes of phenomena and for the representation of 
the cosmos as an ordered whole? At first sight it might seem absurd to 
pose that problem. For are not these among the most obvious and 
unavoidable questions that any philosophy or science must tackle? If so, 
is it not utterly superfluous to ask why Greek philosophers and scientists 
did so?vii 
 
And they respond that, indeed, it is not superfluous but in fact a central question. They 
provide three reasons: 
 
First, these questions were not obvious and explicit at the very beginnings 
of Greek philosophy and science; we can certainly investigate how they 
came to acquire the central importance that they later possessed. 
 
Second, reflection on early philosophy and science elsewhere— especially 
in China—confirms that it is perfectly possible to treat quite different 
concepts as central. The Chinese, as we will see, spoke of phases (hsing), 
not elements; they had no single concept that corresponds to “nature.” 
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According to one view, they were concerned not so much with causes as 
with correlations and configurations of Change… at a first stage of 
discussion…there was nothing inevitable about most of the Greek ways of 
formulating the principal questions. 
 
Third and most directly, the problems that the ancient Greeks used these 
concepts to address have not remained constant and do not look the same 
to us today. Although many Greek terms, as conventionally translated 
into English, may generate the impression that they persist unchanged 
over time, that, too, is a trap. Even when the scientists and philosophers 
who use the concepts today see them as continuous with ancient Greek 
speculation, the concepts in question have in every case changed their 
meaning. The fortunes of the term “physics” illustrate the point. The 
modern word is derived from the Greek phusike, “the study of 
nature,”…But hardly a single component of Greek phusike survives in 
what physicists of today would recognize as their subject matter.viii 
 
Lloyd and Sivin demonstrate how the organization and structure of the two societies 
they discuss, Greece and China, play a fundamental role in the construction of the 
meaning, goals, and methods of scientific inquiry. For instance, the top-down and 
conservative, authoritarian nature of Chinese imperial government played a powerful 
role in financing and organizing scholars and scholarship, down even to the modes of 
scientific writing, which often took the form of private discussion among elites, or a 
letter to the Emperor, or commentary on a traditional text. In the case of Greece, we 
can see the particular importance of Athenian democracy in structuring the role of 
literacy in society, which allowed for opportunities of teaching, debate, and modes of 
scholarship not preponderant in China, such as argumentative philosophical treatises 
and public debates on metaphysical subjects.  
 History, then, provides a powerful solvent to break apart seemingly obvious 
connections, to dissolve things that seem apparent and necessary. Science, language, 
technology, we learn, are all deeply embedded in our culture and history, as are we, we 
who understand and interpret and manipulate the world and ourselves and each other 
in light of larger categories and concepts. This isn’t to say that science does not lead to 
the truth, or that technology isn’t wonderful, though I think the history of science 
provides a powerful antidote to the poisonous idea that science and technology do so 
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necessarily and ineluctably. Rather, it serves to remind us of the important historical 
path dependency of our conceptions about our technology and science. That is, the 
concepts we use to think about science, and, indeed, about the world, come about 
through specific historical processes. These processes do not shed their history—that 
history affects deeply the shape of those ideas, as we’ve seen here in the case of 
obviousness. The upshot is not relativism, but humility.  
 Now that I’ve given some, hopefully provocative, examples of the non-obviousness 
of the seemingly obvious, let me add a more sophisticated example that will also 
suggest a way of understanding this situation. The idea is simple: the light of 
obviousness can only be seen against the dark background of assumptions, often 
hidden or ignored.  
 The brilliant philosopher of science Helen Longino has argued that these background 
assumptions are essential for understanding science, for assumptions are what connect 
our observations, our data, to our theories: some piece of evidence is only evidence for 
a particular theory given certain assumptions about the nature of the world, about what 
we know, and how we think it all fits together.ix For example, to see a particular piece of 
flint as an arrowhead, and to use it in constructing some theory about tool use, one 
must have all sorts of assumptions about the formation of certain kinds of stones, their 
likely and unlikely shapes, how ancient peoples might manipulate flint, the shape 
needed for hunting certain sorts of creatures, and so on and so forth.  
 The point isn’t that these assumptions are made up, or are non-empirical or 
unverifiable. The idea is that what we see and understand is a function of a whole host 
of complex and multifaceted suppositions. To put the point rather simply, why we 
think we know some proposition or another depends upon a whole host of other 
propositions that we think we know. As philosophers have pointed out since (at least) 
Pierre Duhem and W.V.O. Quine, the justification of our beliefs forms a web of 
interconnected propositions. 
 So obviousness is only obviousness within a certain cultural-epistemic system, only 
within a certain scientific paradigm and world-view, only at a certain state of 
technological development, always within a particular historical moment. If and when 
these assumptions are articulated and challenged, what we see and describe in the 
natural world, our scientific theories, our abilities to manipulate and understand the 
world technologically, change and often change radically. Let’s not get carried away, 
however, in thinking that this leads to some sort of severe cultural relativism, or some 
sort of deep skepticism about science. Instead, understanding science in this way helps 
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us, as Longino points out, account for scientific change, for scientific disagreement, 
and can help us understand the role of ideology and bias in science, can help us 
understand when and where and how science goes wrong. 
 I end with a striking example of the harm of obviousness, understood in terms of 
background assumptions. Primatologists and other scientists studying the behavior of 
animals in the 1960s through the 1980s interpreted their observations as supporting a 
concept of patriarchal dominance in primates and other animals, patriarchy being a 
natural—obvious—fact. Upon investigation, however, these inferences were based on a 
set of androcentric assumptions, assumptions that affected our understanding of 
animal breeding systems in certain systematically biased ways. Biologist Sarah Blaffer 
Hrdy calls this scientific community’s set of unquestioned background assumptions 
“the myth of the coy female.”x 
 The myth consisted in the supposed existence of a highly discriminating, sexually 
coy female that was courted by completely undiscriminating males. Females were 
assumed to have a very specific, and utterly passive role in sexual relations, and all 
mating behavior was interpreted in light of this assumption about a female’s ‘natural’ 
role. There were three assumptions:  
 
1. The relative male contribution to offspring is small. 
2. There is little variance in female reproductive success compared to 
great variance among males. 
3. Females are not promiscuous, and fertilization is the only reason for 
females to mate. 
 
These three components of the myth deeply affected the interpretation of observations 
made by those working under its spell: what was obvious for these (exclusively male) 
scientists turned out, with the introduction of female researchers, to be an 
unsubstantiated and unwarranted background assumption.  
 Take the first assumption: the male contribution to the offspring is small, which 
means that males play little role in caring for offspring. Hrdy, however, noted that male 
care is far more extensive in primates than previously theorized. Indeed, in some 
species of primates, promiscuity on the part of females serves to help ensure male care 
for offspring, thus undermining both the first and third components of the myth. For 
example, Goldizen and Terborgh noted promiscuous behavior in female saddle-backed 
tamarins.xi They interpreted this behavior as a mating strategy to confuse the males in a 
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troop about the parentage of offspring, thus helping guarantee the care and safety of 
those offspring by a large number of males even when they are not the offspring’s 
biological parent.  
 Or take the third assumption: this caused researchers to interpret all sexual behavior 
on the part of females as about fertilization. Yet, for primates, there was growing 
evidence since at least the 1960s that females in many prosimian, monkey, and ape 
species managed their own reproductive careers actively to solicit and mate with a 
number of different males. Later fieldwork extended this result to females in other 
species: for instance, Bray, Kennelly, Guarino demonstrated that when the master of a 
red-winged Blackbird harem was vasectomized, his females still conceived, 
demonstrating that female Blackbird’s are promiscuous.xii In a review of literature on 
female sexual behavior, Evelyn Shaw and Joan Darling noted that female shiner perch 
mate with many males even when they are not producing eggs.xiii Prior to the work of 
these and other researchers, scientists quite literally ignored these (obvious?) 
behaviors, for they simply could not exist. Often what we see is limited by what we 
expect to see.  
 These bits of evidence stand in stark contrast to the assumptions of the myth of the 
coy female, and the inferences made on the basis of these assumptions about female 
sexual behavior are thus undermined. By not using these assumptions to interpret the 
evidence, these mostly female researchers questioned and ultimately undermined the 
myth. What had been obvious to a generation of (mostly male) primatologists had been 
exposed as a systematic bias born of androcentric assumptions. 
 
3. Overcoming the Rhetoric of Obviousness 
So obviousness turns out to be a function of our other beliefs, of our assumptions. 
Belief is a web, a complex network with all sorts of dependencies, and different 
individuals, because of different educational and epistemic life histories, have quite 
different networks. Obvious truths to one person are obvious falsehoods to another.  
 So what does this tell us about debates like those concerning vaccination? I think the 
fact that obviousness isn’t obvious leads us to three conclusions, conclusions that, if 
internalized, might help us overcome the rhetoric of obviousness. 
 First, different individuals and different communities have different sets of 
background assumptions. So the most important question to ask in confronting 
resistance to, say, vaccination or evolution, concerns the set of background 
assumptions that lead them to reject vaccination, or evolution. It’s not idiocy, or the 
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inability to grasp obvious truths, that is at issue (at least not always), but rather the 
relative weighing of, say, the trustworthiness of different authorities, of different texts. 
If you grew up in a household that truly and deeply believed the earth is only a few 
thousand years old, then evolution is not obvious at all, far from it. In many cases, what 
people believe and think about the nature of the world has a certain inner-logic, it 
makes sense against the background assumptions they hold. In such cases, there is no 
way that being confronted with the evidence (of, say, vaccination or evolution) can 
automatically lead directly to the acceptance of scientific truths, for there just isn’t any 
such thing as being ‘confronted with the evidence;’ there is only being confronted in 
the context of a whole host of other assumptions.  
 So what needs to be done in these situations is careful analysis of what these people 
believe and why, so that we can pick apart the kinds of assumptions they hold that 
affect the way they understand scientific theories and observations. Simply bombarding 
people with data, observations, charts and graphs, is not helpful in light of the fact that 
the interpretation, the meaning of all this information, is contextually determined, is 
determined by all the myriad beliefs, ideas, and assumptions that complex, 
multifaceted people have. Claims of obviousness that ignore the context-sensitivity of 
our evaluations of evidence, then, are mere rhetorical intimidation, and often serve 
only as signals as to which epistemic and social community one belongs to: what is 
needed is charity, not chastising. Part of the explanation, then, of why debates on 
issues of scientific literacy and the like have proven so unproductive and irreconcilable, 
comes from the fact that these debates only confront peoples’ surface beliefs, the very 
beliefs under issue, and not upon other, essential, nodes in our epistemic networks. 
Our understanding and interpretation of evidence depend upon these nodes. The 
debate thus needs to move to consider not just facts and theories in isolation, but ways 
of seeing and interpreting facts and theories, from observation to interpretation.  
 Of course, many times, people hold inconsistent beliefs, act irrationally, or refuse to 
learn or change their mind; perhaps nothing can be done in these situations. Maybe 
these folks can safely be ignored, dismissed, banished from our ‘reality based’ 
community. But, if we are optimistic, perhaps a more empathetic way of understanding 
their worldview can help redress the situation. So, second, the non-existence of 
obviousness should lead us to adopting a more empathetic view of other ways of 
viewing the world. In this, I think everyone can benefit from cultural anthropology, 
which is founded upon a method that involves the bracketing of one’s own beliefs and 
ways of seeing in favor of truly trying to comprehend another’s. This isn’t to say that 
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it’s always possible, or to reject the idea that some ways of doing and seeing things are 
superior to others. We can’t go back to our flip phones (unless we are hipsters), and, 
overall, hand-washing has proven to be a pretty good idea. But if and when we want to 
convince others of our way, truly understanding their way seems a necessary first step. 
Communication, at least fruitful, productive communication, has to stem from 
understanding or at least the attempt at understanding. A second aspect of the 
explanation for the resoluteness of these debates is thus the fact that they have, on 
both sides, insisted upon the stern enunciation of competing world views, instead of 
attempts at finding points of contact and, perhaps, resolution. Perhaps some views can 
never be made to cohere, but this is not something that can be decided before trying. 
The final lesson is one of skepticism and humbleness. History teaches contingency. 
What we know, or what we think we know, depends a lot on the course of our lives, and 
the time and culture we grow up in. There is, in fact, a kind of disrespect of science at 
the core of the pro-science community in their invocation of obviousness: it discounts 
the work that has been done in order for us to get where we are. One of the prime 
lessons of the history of science and technology—or its current practice, just ask any 
scientist—is that it’s hard, damnably and frustratingly hard. Figuring out nature, 
understanding reality, is and has been the task of generations, and so the obviousness 
of current scientific truths is the result of blood, sweat, and tears. To insist upon the 
utter obviousness of some claim, and to deride an opponent for denying it, betrays this 
history, these hard won truths. Knowledge of the history of science, then, teaches us a 
kind of respect for that history, for that struggle. It also helps define who we are and 
why we think what we think: for we are, both individually and culturally, the sum of all 
those past experiences, ideas, and discoveries, all of that hard work and effort. 
Historicity teaches us that there is no such thing as the obvious, and so our debates, 
even debates with a clear scientific answer should be conducted in light the 
situatedness of both sides of the debate. Obviousness is an achievement. 
 Either that, or we’re all doomed fools.  
 
Benjamin Goldberg 
University of South Florida 
metabenny@gmail.com 
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Notes 
                                                        
i  Obviousness of a sort is sometimes considered in discussions of consciousness and 
phenomenology, but I’m not here concerned with this sense of the word. See: Sytsma, Justin 
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